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Abstract
The international community has spent considerable time, money, and effort attempting to establish a
series of national and regional Centres of Excellence (COEs), also known as Nuclear Security Training
and Support Centres (NSSCs). These Centres tend to have a wide variety of objectives, structures, and
methods of delivery. Unsurprisingly, no internationally accepted standard exists on how they should
operate. The IAEA has produced some excellent guidance (TECDOC 1734), but by virtue of its role
cannot provide standards for benchmarking success. Against this backdrop, the World Institute for
Nuclear Security (WINS) launched the WINS Academy, an initiative to provide practitioners with
opportunities to earn certification in Nuclear Security Management. Underpinning the program is
certification in accordance with the ISO 9001 and ISO 29990 quality management standards. Those
standards provide an internationally recognized external benchmark of quality; demonstrate credibility,
competence and professionalism; and give potential employers and others in the industry an objective
measurement of participants’ knowledge. WINS recommends that NSSCs follow a similar model, in
which their participants receive an evaluation leading to qualification or certification, and using
professional standards developed by a recognized, respected certifying body rather than developing their
own ad hoc arrangements, which are ultimately unsustainable. With the end of the Nuclear Security
Summit (NSS) process, sustainability is the key consideration for many nuclear security training centres;
WINS has sought political and industry commitments to sustain security training programs, and these
efforts were recognized at the 2016 NSS in a Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security
Management.

I.

Introduction

Centres of Excellence (COEs) for professional development are not new; they exist in a wide variety of
industries and serve many different professions and stakeholders. They may be owned and operated by
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international organizations, State organizations, academic institutions, or the private sector. In recent
years there has been a particular focus on COEs for nuclear security; this has in part been encouraged by
the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process and the desire of some States to demonstrate an enhanced
training capability. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and States are increasingly referring
to these entities as Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSCs, a term more descriptive of
their function and less presumptuous regarding their relative excellence).
Many Centres have been formed as a result of commitments made during the U.S.-initiated NSS process,
which ended in March 2016. There are legitimate concerns that the potential reduction in high-level
political support will mark the beginning of the end for Centres that have not yet carved out a welldefined role with broad stakeholder support [1]. In this light, several organizations have attempted to
suggest best practices for the Centres. The IAEA, in particular, has taken a leading role by establishing
the International Network for NSSCs, which is a technical network helping coordinate efforts among the
various Centres. The Network has been well received and currently involves a large body of
representatives from 56 Member States who meet biannually in Vienna to discuss progress and exchange
ideas [2].
Based on information contained in the Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC), discussions held at
the IAEA, and visits to facilities, many of the Centres are being established to provide security-awareness
training courses[3]. Some Centres also focus on technical support for nuclear security, whereas others
focus on training and research relating to nuclear security, safety, safeguards, and other related
disciplines. The more advanced centres include impressive physical facilities for guard-force training and
technical capabilities for both research and demonstration purposes. Some Centres include chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) objectives. Clearly, no standard format for an NNSC exists.
Many have relied on external funding and support to become established and operational, and some may
not survive without continued external support.
Given that many Centres have received considerable funding, the question therefore becomes: will they
be sustainable and do they teach the right things? In the opinion of the World Institute for Nuclear
Security (WINS), there is a danger of missed opportunity because many training programs in nuclear
security fail to build professional capacity within stakeholder groups. Often, the emphasis seems to be on
“doing something” rather than on taking the time to consider objectives and longer-term needs before
deciding on a course of action.
Addressing this concern, this paper provides an example of how WINS has developed its training
program in nuclear security, with an overview of accomplishments to date, how WINS evaluates the
successes or failures of the program, how to maintain quality and develop training standards through
using ISO quality management systems, and steps to take for international commitments in support of
nuclear security training. Any training centre will benefit from applying similar systematic approaches
based on ISO.

II.

The WINS Academy

As the NSSC network developed, WINS began a project, called the WINS Academy, to provide
practitioners with professional development in nuclear security management. The idea was to develop an
international certification program for nuclear security, similar to the certification programs that exist for
a variety of professions such as IT security, aviation security, and maritime shipping security. First
proposed at the March 2012 Nuclear Industry Summit in Seoul, WINS launched the program at the March
2014 Nuclear Industry Summit (NIS) in Amsterdam.
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Since the launch in 2014, WINS has drafted ten comprehensive training modules that comprise a
complete program curriculum. Each module has been developed in collaboration with subject matter
experts and has been based on:
— Experience gained by being the world’s first practitioner-based nuclear security organization.
WINS currently has nearly 3,500 members in about 120 countries who give us continuous
feedback about what is important to their professions.
— The development of 36 Best Practice Guides (to date) on nuclear security topics of relevance to
practitioners.
— Over 70 practitioner workshops and events held around the world on nuclear security issues
relevant to practitioners.
In total the program has developed around 1,750 pages of training material, all drafted by subject matter
experts, technically edited, and peer reviewed.
The target audience for the modules is a multi-disciplinary group including board members, executive
managers, security directors, scientists/technicians/engineers, offsite incident responders, regulators, and
other professionals with management responsibilities for nuclear and radioactive source security (Figure
1). All participants begin with a core Foundation Module that sets out security as a fundamental aspect of
risk management and corporate reputation, as well as a strategic, operational activity that needs to be
implemented organization-wide. Participants then choose one elective module according to their interests,
needs, and background. After completing both modules, they have the opportunity to take proctored
exams; if they pass, they are certified by WINS as a Certified Nuclear Security Professional (CNSP).

Figure 1. WINS Academy Completed Curriculum.

III. Methodology for Assessing Results
The purpose of providing training to nuclear security professionals is not only to improve their skills and
knowledge base, but also to demonstrate that these improved skills and knowledge actually lead to
improved decision making and increase the effectiveness of an organization’s nuclear security program.
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Nuclear security training programs represent a significant investment and should support organizational
goals and strategic objectives. Therefore, it is important to validate their quality and impact in order to
guide future development.
Unfortunately, reliable, effective measures for evaluating the impact that nuclear security training has on
organizational behavior have lagged behind the growth in training [4]. This is why it is now critical to
find effective, repeatable ways for organizations to measure return on investment. An example of a model
that has been found especially effective in this regard is called the Kirkpatrick Model. (Its most recent
version is now called the New World Kirkpatrick Model) [5].
The Kirkpatrick Model is one of the most widely used approaches to evaluating training results. Its
objective is to help organizations determine the extent to which participants can apply their training to
their work in a way that demonstrably increases organizational performance. The Model consists of four
levels:

1. Reaction: The degree to which participants react favorably to the training.
2. Learning: The degree to which participants acquire the intended knowledge, skills,
attitudes, confidence, and commitment based on their participation in a training event.
3. Behavior: The degree to which participants apply, back on the job, what they learned
during training.
4. Results: The degree to which targeted outcomes occur as a result of the training event
and subsequent reinforcement.
A.

Level 1: Reaction

From what WINS has seen, much of the training carried out by current NSSCs/COEs involves neither
structured evaluation nor certification. If it were to be assessed, it would probably achieve Level 1 on the
Kirkpatrick scale.
In many respects, level 1 evaluation involves awareness training since at this level no attempt is made to
establish whether participants actually learn anything from a course. WINS evaluates at level 1 by
collecting participants’ feedback to capture immediate reaction and evaluate their degree of satisfaction.
An example of feedback is included below for illustration.
“The WINS Academy nuclear security Foundation Module and the Executive
Management Module provided me with a thorough and accessible overview of the critical
aspects of nuclear security that are important to many who interface with nuclear
technology. The course syllabus was very clear, very well structured and well resourced.
There were also plenty of opportunities to consider deeply the consequences of different
options available to nuclear professionals and executives when it comes to maintaining
the security of their activities and facilities. I would happily recommend the WINS
Academy Program to other professionals in the nuclear industry.”

— Simon Gillett, EDK, United Kingdom
Surveys also provide a means to evaluate the reaction of participants immediately after they have
completed the learning event. Each WINS Academy module includes a post-course survey and post-exam
survey to measure participant satisfaction. WINS reviews the feedback collected to identify corrective
actions and to improve the learning experience. For example, based on participant post-course feedback,
WINS has developed professionally designed and published hard copies of all its training materials, along
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with an update to a new, modern eLearning platform. WINS has also begun revising all modules, taking
into account participant feedback.

B.

Level 2: Learning

Level 2 of the Kirkpatrick Model assesses the depth of learning that occurs as a result of the training. To
do so, it often uses tests before and/or after training. Assessment at this level moves the evaluation
beyond learner satisfaction to the degree to which participants actually improve their competence
(knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes). Measurement is fairly simple because most activities and
interactions undertaken during a learning program are also measurements of learning. Examples include
formal and informal testing, team assessment, and self-assessment.
The use of proctored knowledge examination is a common approach for many professional training
programs, and this method has been adopted by WINS. In order to ensure that the most reliable testing
measures are used in assessing candidates, WINS partners with Pearson VUE, the world’s largest
provider of computer-based testing for information technology, and for academic, government, and
professional testing programs. Through this partnership, WINS Academy exams can be taken in over
5,100 Pearson-accredited test centers in 180 countries.
In two years, WINS has delivered 475 exams, out of which 374 have been passed, which corresponds to
an average pass rate of 78.7%. This is in line with standards for typical professional certification exams,
which vary widely but typically range between 70-80% pass rates, with some lower and some higher (for
example, pass rates on certain medical exams may range from 85-95%) [6].
WINS continually collects data on the exams and will be revising the exams based on psychometric data
to ensure they are valid, reliable, and fair. Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (SEPT)
describes validity as the most fundamental consideration in developing and evaluating exams [7]. Validity
relies on answers to several questions:
— Does the exam measure what it is intended to measure?
— Are the interpretations drawn from the exam scores appropriate and justifiable?
— Is the exam free of basis?
— Is there fair treatment with regard to test procedures and scoring?
— Does the test achieve equivalent results regardless of race or ethnicity?
— Are there equitable opportunities to learn the material covered by the test?
To answer these questions, WINS structures all its Academy certification modules around a core set of
learning objectives and assessment criteria. Content is written to these learning objectives, and exam
questions are cross-referenced to both the content and the objectives to ensure that exams are asking
relevant and appropriate questions. Furthermore, testing experts at Pearson systematically review all
questions to ensure they are clear, reliable, and fair. In addition, each Pearson-accredited test center has a
strict set of procedures, including global identity-based management, automated and integrated check-in
processing, ID verification, digital signature, photo capture, and proctored monitoring. These procedures
prevent the possibility of impersonators taking exams on behalf of registered participants and damaging
the integrity of the examination program.

C.

Levels 3 and 4: Behavior and Results

Levels 3 and 4 of the Kirkpatrick Model measure the change that has occurred in learners’ behavior as a
result of the training. The goal is to ascertain whether learners are using their newly acquired skills,
knowledge, and attitudes in their everyday environment. Consequently, this level represents a better
assessment of a program’s effectiveness. Level 4 correlates directly to behavior change by measuring the
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impact of the training and reinforcement methods on organizational results. Frequently thought of as the
bottom line, this final level measures the success of the training program and can be expressed in business
terms such as increased productivity, improved quality, decreased costs, and higher profits.
To measure these levels of evaluation, in October 2015, WINS created the WINS Academy Alumni, an
interactive platform dedicated to bolstering the professional development of participants who have passed
their certification examinations. The overall objectives of the WINS Academy Alumni Network are to
stay engaged with graduates of the Academy program, provide them with additional opportunities for
professional development, measure their continuing development, and secure their feedback to help
continuously improve the Academy program.
WINS is still in the early stages of collecting data to conduct this level of evaluation. A first step in this
direction has been to launch quarterly feedback surveys for CNSPs that aim to measure the value and
implementation of the certification training. The first such survey was released in Q4 2015 and asked
participants to evaluate the Value of Certification. Additional surveys were released in Q1 and Q2 2016.
Some of the preliminary results include the following: (Results are expressed as a percentage of the
respondents.)
— 96.6% believe they will benefit from an annual WINS Academy Career Report.
— 94.6% state that Certification has had a positive impact on their professional image/reputation.
— 94.6% will undertake another professional development program in the 12 months that follow
their WINS Certification.
In addition, when asked why they have pursued certification through the WINS Academy, respondents
answered:
—
—
—
—

91.9% to improve their professional profile.
83.8% to enhance their professional reputation with colleagues, employers, or customers.
83.8% to have an accurate measure of their knowledge.
64.9% to improve their CV/resume.

Moreover, more than half of the CNSPs indicate that one of the benefits they gained from the certification
is they are able to do their job more efficiently. A large number also indicate that they have taken on
management responsibilities as a result of their certification. Almost half of CNSPs also indicate that the
benefit they experienced after having achieved the certification was immediate.
These results are evolving as additional Academy participants become CNSPs and will be reported in full
in a Career Report at the end of 2016. In the meantime, WINS continues to develop new tools and metrics
to use the Alumni Network to evaluate the impact of the Academy training on participants.

IV. Ensuring and Maintaining Program Quality
The WINS Academy and all the various NSSCs are engaged in professional training, as distinct from
university education, which requires an entirely different approach to quality assurance. Universities
typically achieve a recognized standard through national-level accreditation for their activities; however,
such an approach may not be appropriate for the vast majority of COEs.
So how can COEs receive external evaluation and validation of their approach? One answer is to adopt
methods for evaluating professional training that are already well established and used in a myriad of
professional settings. The best practice approach WINS has found is the International Organization for
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Standardization (ISO) and its International Standard ISO 29990:2010 Learning Services for Non-Formal
Education and Training. ISO explains that:
“The objective of this International Standard is to provide a generic model for quality
professional practice and performance, and a common reference for learning service
providers (LSPs) and their clients in the design, development and delivery of non-formal
education, training and development. This International Standard uses the term “learning
services” rather than “training” in order to encourage a focus on the learner and the
results of the process, and to emphasise the full range of options available for delivering
learning services. This International Standard focuses on the competency of LSPs.” [8]
ISO 29990 provides a unified model for a quality and professional mode of operation, as well as a
common reference point for a Centre that is conceiving, developing, and delivering programs. The
standard is designed for all training institutions and promotes transnational cooperation in vocational
education. Its strongest point is a focus on the learner, including learning outcomes and evaluation of
learning results to demonstrate evidence of competence and quality. The benefits of such an approach are
evident for three important groups of stakeholders [9]:
Benefit for Centres: The providers of certified learning obtain a standard of proof
regarding the organized training of the institution. The qualitative level of the training
provided is quantifiable and comparable worldwide.
Benefits for Learners: Learners can better select their training based on the needs and
expectations that match the skills and abilities they want to acquire. It also ensures an
improved learning environment, greater transparency, and strong international
recognition in the professional development market.
Benefits for International Cooperation: The standard provides an internationally
comparable benchmark of quality without distorting the competitive market and provides
the basis for developing further specific requirements for international cooperation in the
area of education and training.
To set an example for the nuclear security training community, WINS achieved ISO 29990:2010
certification in December 2014. ISO 29990 certification provides an internationally recognized external
benchmark of quality; demonstrates credibility, competence and professionalism; and gives potential
employers and others in the industry an objective measurement of participants’ knowledge. Such
knowledge is also transferrable across international boundaries. WINS recommends that all NSSCs
follow a similar model, in which their programs are evaluated against professional standards developed
by a recognized, respected certifying body rather than developing their own ad hoc arrangements, which
are ultimately unsustainable. And to support the approach, WINS is developing detailed ISO 29990
implementation guidance for NSSCs and will assist Centres upon request.

V.

Maintaining Momentum

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), thirty-five States sponsored a Joint Statement on
Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. The aim of this Joint Statement was for subscribing
States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime,
and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint
Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in
2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support [10].
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One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security
Implementation is for subscribing States to “ensure that management and personnel with accountability
for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States
can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:
— Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education,
certification and/or qualification activities; and
— Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)
best practice guides and training activities.
To further support INFCIRC/869, on 5 April 2016, twelve States released a Joint Statement on Certified
Training for Nuclear Security Management [11]. By committing to support the WINS Academy in the
Joint Statement, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States recognized that the challenges
associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are varied and complex, and that
effective security relies upon the competence of management and personnel who are responsible for this
work.
The signatory States plan to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA’s
NSSC Network and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN). The signatory
States also plan to encourage other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible
commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear
security.

VI. Conclusion
International recognition of the need for specialized security training for staff has increased substantially
in the last decade and led to a rapid rise in training programs. The IAEA currently runs a host of training
courses aimed primarily at increasing the awareness of attendees about IAEA Guidance, including the
Nuclear Security Series of documents, and it uses industry consultants to run specialized courses. Still,
none of the courses currently offered by the IAEA leads to professional certification. This situation is
unlike, for example, civil aviation, wherein the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) certify their professional development courses in security
and other subjects [12].
The requirements for certification in aviation security arose because of the events of 9/11. WINS worries
that it might take the nuclear security equivalent of 9/11 to shake States out of their complacency and
recognize that the industry needs internationally accredited and certified systems for ensuring the basic
competence of personnel responsible for protecting some of the world’s most dangerous material. As one
official noted while discussing the state of nuclear security arrangements, “We have been running a
system a certain way for such a long time and not really thinking about whether it was working or not
[13].”
WINS will continue to combat this complacency and provide an example for the international community
through the progress of our certification program. Now that we have completed the rollout of the
Academy online, we will be working on the development of “blended” online and in-person training,
delivered in partnership with NSSCs and other training centres. This blended learning model, leading to
certification, has been adopted by aviation and a host of other international certification programs
throughout the world.
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WINS will also support nuclear security training centres in reaching their own meaningful standards
through the achievement of ISO 2990 certification. Having an international benchmark against which
training services can be evaluated is a highly effective way to identify an organization’s needs and the
needs of individual learners—and to evaluate the results of learning. It also provides an effective tool for
helping assess the management of resources, finances, and risk, and is consistent with the widely used
ISO 9001 Quality Management Standard.
The primary premise underlying the WINS Academy is the necessity to demonstrate individual
competence through professional certification, supported by training centres that use internationally
recognized systems for managing quality. Leaders of industry who participated in the Nuclear Industry
Summits (NIS) supported this approach when they committed to “ensuring that all personnel with
accountabilities for security are demonstrably competent by establishing appropriate standards for the
selection, training, and certification of staff [14].”

VII.
VII.
VII.
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